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COMMENT
WESTERN LIVE STOCK v. BUREAU OF REVENUE
(Feb. 28, 1938), 58 Sup. Ct. 546.
By GUSTAV H. DONGUS*
The reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
recent decision of Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue is of
particular import to those lawyers and taxpayers in Indiana who are
interested in the outcome of the case of J. D. Adams Manufacturing
Co. v. Storen (Ind. 1937), 7 N. E. (2d) 941, now on appeal from
the Supreme Court of Indiana. (No. 641 in the Supreme Court of
the United States; argued March 30, 31, 1938.)1
*Of the Indianapolis Bar.
I Since this comment was written the Supreme Court of the United States
has handed down a decision in the J. D. Adams case reversing the Supreme
Court of Indiana on the point referred to herein.
COMMENT
In the Western Live Stock case the State of New Mexico attempted
to tax the gross receipts of a local publisher from advertising contracts
entered into with non-residents. The New Mexico statute, section
201, chapter 7, of the Special Session Laws of 1934; provided for a
"privilege tax" measured by "an amount equal to 2 per cent of the
gross receipts of any person" engaged in the publication of newspapers
and magazines, such gross receipts only to include amounts received
for the sale of advertising space. The taxpayer published a monthly
live stock journal which was circulated both within and without the
State of New Mexico. It solicited advertising from parties in other
states and payment for advertising was made at the principal and only
office in New Mexico. It was held that the taxation of such gross
receipts was not an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
At first blush it would seem that the Court might have disposed
of the case on the ground that the negotiation and execution of the
advertising contracts is not commerce; therefore, a tax on the gross
receipts from such contracts would not burden interstate commerce.
The Court did set forth the established principle that the mere forma-
tion of contracts is not commerce, citing the insurance cases such as
Paul v. Virginia (1868), 8 Wall 168. It then, however, proceeded
to assume that the advertising contracts contemplated an interstate
performance, that but for the out-of-state circulation no income would
have been received from non-resident advertisers, a causa sine qua non.
It is the ensuing statements by Mr. Justice Stone, who delivered the
majority opinion of the Court, which are of interest.
Mr. Justice Stone discusses the numerous cases involving state
gross receipts taxation on interstate commerce and says at pages 548-549
of 58 Sup. Ct. that the ratio decidendi of the decisions is as follows:
"The vice characteristic of those which have been held invalid is
that they have placed on the commerce burdens of such a nature as
to be capable in point of substance, of being imposed, . . . or
added to, . . with equal right by every state which the com-
merce touches, merely because interstate commerce is being done, so
that without the protection of the commerce clause it would bear
cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce."
Dicta from several cases, and which could hardly be straws in the
wind, is cited in support of the proposition. In fact, what Mr. Justice
Stone is doing is to lay down new law under the commerce clause; law
similar to that now developing under the due process clause. In apply-
ing this newly discovered principle of multiple taxation on interstate
commerce to previous decisions by the Court, showing how cases fall on
one side of the line or the other, he experiences some difficulty. Regard-
ing the case before the bar, the principle furnished an additional rea-
son, besides the established "direct burden" doctrine, to uphold the tax,
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inasmuch as no other state was in a position to levy a tax on the trans-
actions involved.
It is this possibility of multiple taxation which is overlooked by
Judge Fansler in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Ihdi-
ana in the J. D. Adams case. Judge Fansler's opinion is based on the
premise that the Indiana Gross income tax is a general tax, does not
discriminate against persons doing an interstate business, and that such
persons are only bearing their fair burden of taxation in return for
benefits furnished by the State of Indiana. Equality to all is the theme.
An intrastate sale in Indiana bears no further tax but that is not
true with respect to an interstate sale, which ex necessitate involves
activities in another state and may bring into operation the taxing laws
of that foreign state. For example, a number of states have a "use"
tax or "compensating" tax and as soon as goods shipped by an Indiana
seller arrive in such a state the use tax operates, thus resulting in an
additional burden on the interstate sale. The use tax has been ap-
proved by the Supreme Court of the United States in Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co. (1937), 300 U. S. 577.' The argument of Mr.
Justice Cardoza in giving the majority opinion of the Court is that
of equality to all taxpayers within the state, the use tax being com-
plementary in identical amount to a local sales tax.
It follows that if the State of Indiana, or state of origin of an
interstate sale, may tax the gross receipts from such sale, and the
state of destination may tax the goods upon their arrival, then inter-
state sales are subjected to a two-fold burden, whereas local sales in
both states are only subject to one. Applying Mr. Justice Stone's prin-
ciple of law to this situation and conceding the power of the state of
destination to tax, the State of Indiana or state of origin should be
prohibited from taxing the gross receipts. That result should logically
follow irrespective of whether the Indiana gross income tax is a di-
rect tax on gross receipts, or a local privilege tax measured by gross
receipts, on an "in lieu of" property tax.
At precisely this point the principle cannot be applied with inexor-
able logic. Compare the case of American Manufacturing Co. v. St.
Louis (1919), 250 U. S. 459, with that of Crew Levick Co. v.
Pennsylvania (1917), 245 U. S. 292. In the former case the Court
sustained a local manufacturing tax measured by the value of the
goods sold including those sold in interestate commerce as a privilege
tax measured by gross receipts; in the latter case a local tax on whole-
salers measured by a percentage of the gross receipts including gross
receipts from interstate and foreign commerce was held invalid as
a direct tax on gross receipts. , Assuming that the goods in each case
are similar and are sent to the same state of destination and are taxed
there, an equal possibility of multiple taxation exists. Mr. Justice Stone
contrasts both cases in his opinion and apparently approves of both,
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although they lead in opposite directions and cannot be reconciled under
any theory of multiple taxation.
A recent decision following the Western Live Stock case is that of
Cloverdale v. drkansas Louisiana Pipeline Company (April 4, 1938),
58 Sup. Ct. 736. It was there argued that the "energy" tax of the
State of Louisiana as applied to power produced by motors operating
compressor units on an interstate gas line was unconstitutional since
each state through which the pipe line passed could lay a similar tax.
The Supreme Court rejected that argument for the reason that a
tax by another state would be on power produced by different motors
at different compressors and therefore would not be on the same
activity.
If that is true, then it becomes difficult to apprehend any state
tax which might be .prohibited by multiple taxation, since the activity
taxed in one state would usually not be the same as that taxed in an-
other. One such tax, however, might be mentioned, and that is a
direct tax bn interstate transportation which is not apportioned to the
transportation carried on within the taxing state. Such a tax would
reach the transportation in another state which could also be taxed
there. Btit multiple taxation as further defined in the Cloverdale case
would not solve the state privilege tax cases measured by gross receipts
for the reason that the privilege exercised in one state is never the
same in point of 'fact as that exercised in another state. Multiple
taxation as so defined would not condemn such privilege taxes although
the measure of such taxes might include gross receipts unapportioned.
With respect to the Indiana gross income tax which has been said
by the Supreme Court of Indiana to be a general privilege tax measured
by gross receipts, and which is not a tax on any particular privilege,
such as that of manufacturing or producing energy, each state is in
an equal position to tax the same general privilege, i. e., the privilege
of receiving gross income. If a manufacturer in Indiana sells to a
wholesaler-in a second state, the receiving of gross income in Indiana
by the manufacturer is a distinct and separate activity from the receipt
of gross income by the wholesaler. Each state could thus apparently
tax the so-called privilege, although the wholesaler might sell to a
broker in a third state, who in turn might sell to the ultimate con-
sumer in a fourth state. However, if the Indiana gross income tax
is taken for what it actually is, a direct tax on gross income or gross
receipts, then in as much as such gross receipts are attributable in part
to activities carried on in other states and are not apportioned, then
the tax is invalid. As a privilege tax or as a direct tax on gross receipts,
the burden is the same.
The Western Live Stock case and the Cloverdale case also pose
the problem whether the criteria of a state tax unconstitutionally bur-
dening interstate commerce is the ability of another state or states to
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tax, or whether the doctrine of direct burden and multiple taxation
are two independent conceptions which must be met if a tax is to be
valid. Mr. Justice Stone, in his opinion, states, as heretofore noted,
that the test of previous decisions which had been determined under
the direct burden doctrine is that of multiple taxation, but further on
in his opinion states that an "added reason" for sustaining the tax is
that as a practical matter no other state could tax. Mr. Justice Reed
in the Cloverdale case says that the tax there did not "interfere" with
interstate commerce, and further says that among other factors show-
ing a lack of interference is that the particular tax connot be imposed
by more than, one state. These decisions would seem to indicate that
multiple taxation is merely one of several, perhaps of many, factors
that go to make up an unconstitutional burden on or interference with
interstate commerce and that it is not the decisive test as indicated
in the first part of the Western Live Stock opinion.
Perhaps the most that can be said for the principle announced in the
Western Live Stock case is that in some situations it furnishes an
additional possible ground upon which a.state tax may either be up-
held or invalidated. It does not explain the dichotomy in the existing
cases nor can it be expected to furnish an open sesame for counsel in
future litigation. The comparatively numerous cases of multiple taxa-
tion under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in-
dicate that unconstitutional multiple taxation is not a clear-cut concep-
tion. There is no reason to expect a greater degree of clarity under
the commerce clause.
Mr. Justice Stone recognizes the difficulties in making interstate
commerce pay its way and at the same time not unduly hampering
such commerce and states that "practical rather than logical distinctions
must be sought." That is the very formula which has apparently been
followed under the direct burden doctrine, arid since it means that
each case will be governed by the facts and not abstract propositions,
no unprecedented certainty in this conflicting field of the law is to be
anticipated.
RECENT CASE NOTES
TRADE-MARKS--TERRrrORIAL EXTENT OF TRADE-MARK RIGTs-Appellant,
in 1915, adopted "Bond" as its trade-mark for bread and bakery products.
Appellee, in 1931, started operating department stores in and around Chicago,
using the trade-mark "Goldblatt's Bond" on razor blades, shaving cream, and
cigars, and thereafter extended its use to some 300 items sold by its stores,
including bread. Appellant uses its trade-mark within a radius of 50 miles
of St. Louis, and within a radius of 50 to 75 miles of Indianapolis. Appellee
has a market within a radius of 50 miles of Chicago. Suit for an injunction;
